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Come Now Appellants, Tamo Maynard and David Fischer, and 
petition this Honorable Court pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, for an order granting rehearing of their 
appeal in the above matter on the grounds that the court failed to 
address the issue of waiver in its Opinion. 
In the Opinion dated February 23, 1996, a copy of which is 
attached, the court addressed only two issues, the merger doctrine 
and the trial court's award of attorney's fees under the Earnest 
Money Agreement. In the Opinion, the court analyzed and rejected 
the Plaintiffs' claims that the closing instructions avoided the 
doctrine of merger. In so doing, the court completely failed to 
consider other issues raised by the Appellants, both below and 
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before this Court, in particular, the application of the doctrine 
of waiver. 
Waiver was raised in the trial court on page 6 of the 
Appellants' memorandum opposing the Appellees' motion for summary 
judgment. There, the Appellants argued that the Appellees had 
waived any claim that merger doctrine applied to. The Appellants 
cited Soter's Inc. v. Deseret Savings and Loan, 857 P. 2d 935 (Utah 
1993) . The trial court failed to consider the doctrine of waiver, 
and the Appellants made this issue one of the primary points of 
their Brief on Appeal. 
At page 10-12 of their Brief on Appeal, the Appellants argued, 
"Facts Remain on the Issue of Waiver." There they argued that 
Appellees' closing in the face of the closing instructions and 
Appellees' conceded understanding that Appellants would not have 
closed without reserving their rights constituted waiver of those 
rights by Appellees. 
In addition to having been argued in the Appellants' primary 
Brief, waiver was also argued in their Reply Brief at pages 7-8. 
It is clear that the rights of the Appellees may be waived 
though they did not sign a document which caused them to be waived. 
The general policy in Utah on this issue is described at Utah Code 
Ann. §70A-2-209. Relevant portions of that section of the Code 
read: 
(2) A signed agreement which excludes modification 
or rescission except by a signed writing cannot be 
otherwise modified or rescinded, but except as between 
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merchants such requirement on a form supplied by the 
merchant must be separately signed by the other party. 
Subparagraph 4 of that section of the Code reads: 
(4) Although an attempt at modification or 
rescission does not satisfy the requirements of 
Subsection (2) or (3) it can operate as a waiver. 
Paragraph 5 of that section of the Code describes the 
situation in this case: 
(5) A party who has made a waiver affecting an 
executory portion of the contract may retract the waiver 
by reasonable notification received by the other party 
that strict performance will be required of any term 
waived, unless the retraction would be unjust in view of 
a material change of position in reliance on the waiver. 
While the UCC may not be directly applicable to this case, it 
is cited to show the public policy which has been adopted in Utah. 
Case law supports the position of the UCC. In Cheney v. Rucker, 14 
Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86 (Utah 1963), the court said: 
It is a well established rule of law that parties to 
a written contract may modify, waive, or make new 
terms . . . . 
And this was held to be so notwithstanding terms in 
that contract designed to hamper such freedom. 
Cheney v. Rucker was a suit for commissions in arranging a trade of 
real property. The agreement in Cheney v. Rucker was statutorily 
required to be in writing. See Utah Code Ann. §25-5-4(5). This 
shows rights may be waived without a written modification even 
though the underlying agreement is required, by the statute of 
frauds, to be in writing. 
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In Provo City Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803, 806, 
(Utah 1979), where the contract at issue was for redevelopment of 
real property, the court also held: 
. . . It is true that parties to a written contract may 
modify, waive, or make new contractual terms, even if the 
contract itself contains a provision to the contrary. 
Similarly, in White v. Fox, 665 P.2d 1297, 1301 (Utah 1983), 
the court said: 
. . . the respondents argue that the trial court erred in 
instructing the jury on waiver because any waiver of the 
listing agreement must comply with the statute of frauds. 
The respondents cite several cases in support of the 
general rule that any modification of a contract that is 
within the statute of frauds must also comply with the 
statute of frauds. [citation omitted] However, with 
respect to oral modification of written contracts within 
the statute of frauds, this Court has stated: 'If a 
party has changed his position by performing an oral 
modification so that it would be inequitable to permit 
the other party to found a claim upon the original 
agreement as unmodified or defeat the former's claim by 
setting up a defense that performance was not according 
to the written contract, after he has induced or 
consented to the former going forward, the modified 
agreement should be held valid.' 
The right to rely upon the doctrine of merger is a right which 
may be waived. Virtually all of the reported cases in which Utah's 
watershed case on waiver, Soter's Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings 
and Loan, 857 P. 2d 935 (Utah 1993) is cited pertain to rights 
granted under written contracts. C & T Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P. 2d 
623 (Utah 1994), Pasker Gould Ames & Weaver, Inc. v. Morse, 887 
P.2d 872 (Utah App. 1994), and United Park City Mines Co. v. 
Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880 (Utah 1993). 
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The doctrine of waiver is applicable to the case at bar. The 
doctrine was raised in the trial court and raised on appeal, but 
this Court failed to consider that issue on appeal. The court 
should grant Appellants' motion for rehearing, reconsider its 
decision in light of the Appellees' waiver and reverse the trial 
court on the grounds that factual issues remain as to whether or 
not the Appellees waived their right to rely upon the contract and 
the doctrine of merger. 
DATED this f( ' day of March, 1996 
Robert H. Wile 
Attorney for Appellants 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I m^il^d two copies of the foregoing Petition 
for Rehearing on this fa Zn^daY of March, 1996 to the offices of: 
David T. Aagard, Esq. 
1245 East Brickyard Road #530 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Robert H. Wilde 
Attorney for Appellants 
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This opinion is subject to revision before FEB 2 3 1996 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
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Attorneys: Robert H. Wilde and Kelly DeHill, Midvale, for 
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David T. Aagard and Fred G. Biesinger, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellees 
Before Judges Orme, Bench, and Jackson. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Tamo Maynard and David Fischer (buyers) appeal the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment dismissing their complaint 
against Thomas Wharton, Jr. and William Roberts (sellers). 
Buyers alleged breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, 
and fraud arising from their purchase of real estate from 
sellers. Buyers also appeal the trial court's order awarding 
attorney fees to sellers. We affirm in part and reverse in part, 
FACTS 
Buyers negotiated to purchase from sellers approximately 
twenty-five acres of undeveloped property in Bluffdale, Utah. 
Sellers previously had obtained a preliminary survey and plat 
that divided the parcel into nineteen lots. The preliminary plat 
erroneously included a parcel slightly over one acre--Lot 15--
that sellers did not own. During their negotiations, sellers 
gave buyers a copy of the erroneous preliminary plat. Buyers 
tendered an earnest money agreement that described the property 
as follows: "25 acre parcel Sidwell #33-09-451-004 as per 
listing #307269." One of several subsequent addenda to the 
earnest money agreement described a portion of the property as 
"lots 10 through 15," referring to the erroneous preliminary 
plat. 
Almost two months after buyers tendered the earnest money 
agreement, sellers faxed to buyers a copy of sellers' warranty 
deed to the property. That deed's metes and bounds description 
included an explicit exception describing the area erroneously 
labeled Lot 15. Negotiations continued for another two months, 
during which time both sellers and buyers continued to believe 
Lot 15 was included in the twenty-five acre parcel. Shortly 
before closing, buyers learned that sellers did not hold title to 
the parcel labeled Lot 15 on the preliminary plat. Buyers 
contacted sellers, who initially insisted they owned Lot 15. 
However, six days before closing, sellers notified buyers that 
sellers in fact did not own Lot 15 and that sellers could not 
convey Lot 15 to buyers.1 
Buyers and sellers met at the title company but could not 
resolve the issue of Lot 15. Buyers and sellers agreed to meet 
again and close the sale. At the closing, buyers hand delivered 
a short memo addressed to sellers and the title company. The 
memo's reference line stated: "Instructions for closing of 
property at 2700 West 150000 South." Those "Closing 
Instructions" stated: 
Enclosed herewith are our checks totaling 
$48,892.44 representing the down payment 
referenced in the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement dated June 14, 1993. Guardian 
Title Company is authorized to disburse these 
funds and Mr. Wharton and Mr. Roberts are 
authorized to accept them with the 
understanding that we are reserving our 
rights to dispute whether the transaction 
includes and we were sold the property 
identified as lot 15 on the preliminary plat 
and the right to claim damages and fees under 
paragraph "N" of the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement. If this reservation is not 
acceptable the checks are to be returned to 
us and the closing is not to proceed. 
1. Sellers assert they did not deliberately mislead buyers. 
Sellers attribute the mistake in the preliminary plat to a 
surveyor error of which sellers were ignorant. 
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Neither buyers nor sellers signed the "Closing Instructions." 
The parties proceeded with the closing and signed a warranty 
deed, trust deed, trust deed note, and associated closing 
documents. None of those closing documents referred to or 
incorporated the "Closing Instructions" that buyers had delivered 
to sellers and the title company. Buyers recorded the warranty 
deed and took possession of the property. 
Approximately one month after the closing, buyers filed the 
instant suit, alleging breach of contract, negligent 
misrepresentation, and fraud. Sellers moved for summary 
judgment, arguing that the earnest money agreement's abrogation 
clause and the doctrine of merger precluded buyers from 
maintaining a cause of action based on an earnest money agreement 
after buyers accepted the warranty deed. The trial court granted 
sellers' motion. Sellers then moved for attorney fees and costs, 
relying on a provision of the earnest money agreement regarding 
default and attorney fees. The trial court granted sellers* 
motion for fees and costs and entered a judgment against buyers. 
Buyers appealed. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On appeal, buyers argue that issues of material fact 
surrounding their claims preclude summary judgment. Buyers also 
argue that sellers are not entitled to attorney fees because 
sellers did not show that buyers defaulted on the earnest money 
agreement. Buyers' appeal thus presents two issues for our 
review: first, whether the doctrine of merger applies and 
entitles sellers to summary judgment; and second, whether sellers 
may recover attorney fees under the earnest money agreement. 
Both issues present a question of law that we review for 
correctness, affording no particular deference to the trial 
court. £££ Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 
1988) (awardablity of attorney fees); Secor v. Knight. 716 P.2d 
790, 792-93 (Utah 1986) (applicability of merger doctrine); see 
frlSQ State v. Richardson. 843 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah App. 1992) 
(stating "we consider the trial court's interpretation of binding 
case law as presenting a question of law and review the trial 
court's interpretation of that law for correctness"). 
MERGER DOCTRINE 
It is well settled that the merger doctrine applies in Utah. 
The Utah Supreme Court explained the merger doctrine as follows: 
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The doctrine of merger . . . is applicable 
when the acts to be performed by the seller 
in a contract relate only to the delivery of 
title to the buyer. Execution and delivery 
of a deed by the seller then usually 
constitute full performance on his [or her] 
part, and acceptance of the deed by the buyer 
manifests his [or her] acceptance of that 
performance even though the estate conveyed 
may differ from that promised in the 
antecedent agreement. Therefore, in such a 
case, the deed is the final agreement and all 
prior terms, whether written or verbal, are 
extinguished and unenforceable. 
Stubbs v. Hemmert. 567 P.2d 168, 169 (Utah 1977) (footnotes 
omitted); accord, e.g.. Secor v. Knight. 716 P.2d 790, 793 (Utah 
1986); Schafir v. Harriaan. 879 P.2d 1384, 1391-92 (Utah App. 
1994); Embassy Group. Inc. v. Hatch. 865 P.2d 1366, 1370 (Utah 
App. 1993). The doctrine of merger is "routinely applied when an 
antecedent agreement contains an abrogation clause." Embassy 
Group, 865 P.2d at 1371. Moreover, "a deed is tantamount to a 
final real estate contract and usually abrogates a preliminary 
earnest money agreement containing an abrogation clause." Id. 
The abrogation clause at issue here is typical; it provides: 
"Except for express warranties made in this Agreement, execution 
and delivery of final closing documents shall abrogate this 
Agreement." In other words, an abrogation clause is a 
contractual statement of the common law doctrine of merger. 
The merger doctrine has four discrete exceptions: (1) mutual 
mistake in the drafting of the final documents; (2) ambiguity in 
the final documents; (3) existence of rights collateral to the 
contract of sale; and (4) fraud in the transaction. See Secor. 
879 P.2d at 793; Embassy Group. 865 P.2d at 1371-72. In the 
present case, buyers contend their "Closing Instructions" 
preclude application of the merger doctrine. Buyers argue the 
"Closing Instructions" memorialize the parties1 intent regarding 
the sale of the twenty-five acres and thus sustain the earnest 
money agreement's viability after closing. Our analysis reveals, 
however, that the "Closing Instructions" do not fall within one 
of the merger doctrine's four exceptions. Buyers concede the 
exceptions for mutual mistake and ambiguity do not apply to the 
present case. Consequently, our analysis focuses on the 
collateral rights and fraud exceptions. 
First, the exception for collateral rights "applies when the 
seller's performance involves some act collateral to the 
conveyance of title." Embassy Group. 865 P.2d at 1372. For 
example, terms in an earnest money agreement requiring sellers to 
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remove certain equipment from their property are collateral to 
conveyance of the property; therefore, a deed does not extinguish 
those terms. Stubbs. 567 P.2d at 170. " [T]he question of 
whether a specific term is or is not collateral, and hence 
whether the term will or will not merge into the deed, is 
determined by the intent of the parties." Secor, 716 P.2d at 
793. However, Utah courts need not look to the parties1 intent 
on issues relating to title and encumbrances because such issues 
"relate to the same subject matter as does the deed." Id. 
Issues relating to title and encumbrances are central rather 
than collateral to agreements for the sale of real estate. 
Accordingly, buyers' reliance on the "Closing Instructions" as 
evidence of the parties' intent is misplaced. Because the issue 
of Lot 15 relates to conveyance of title, the parties' intent 
regarding Lot 15 is irrelevant after delivery and acceptance of 
the deed. The merger doctrine's collateral rights exception thus 
does not apply because this case involves terms relating to 
title. 
Next, the exception for fraud applies when the party seeking 
to avoid merger can prove by clear and convincing evidence that 
the other party committed fraud in the real estate transaction. 
Id. at 794. In Utah, the elements of fraud are the following: 
(1) a representation; (2) concerning a 
presently existing material fact; (3) which 
was false; (4) which the representor either 
(a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, 
knowing that he [or she] had insufficient 
knowledge on which to base such 
representation; (5) for the purpose of 
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) 
that the other party, acting reasonably and 
in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact 
rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to 
act; (9) to his [or her] injury and damage. 
Duaan v. Jones. 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980) (footnote 
omitted) . Buyers admit they knew sellers could not convey Lot 15 
to them at least six days before they accepted the final closing 
documents. Consequently, buyers cannot establish that they acted 
reasonably and in ignorance of the falsity of sellers' earlier 
representations about Lot 15. Buyers thus, as a matter of law, 
cannot establish fraud, and "[i]n the absence of fraud, the 
merger doctrine applies." Secor, 716 P.2d at 794. 
The Utah Supreme Court has described the merger doctrine as 
"an admittedly harsh rule of law." Id. Nevertheless, Utah 
adheres to the merger doctrine because it "preserves the 
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integrity of the final document of conveyance and encourages the 
diligence of the parties." Id. at 795 (emphasis added). Parties 
to real estate transactions have a duty "to make certain that 
their agreements have in fact been fully included in the final 
document." Id. In the present case, buyers claim that 
delivering their "Closing Instructions" to sellers and the title 
company fulfilled their duty of diligence. We disagree. Parties 
to real estate transactions must ensure that any agreements 
involving conveyance or encumbrance of title are incorporated 
into the final closing document, which is usually a warranty 
deed. Buyers' "Closing Instructions" were not incorporated into 
the deed that sellers tendered and buyers accepted. Accordingly, 
the "Closing Instructions" have no legal significance. 
In sum, parties to the sale of real estate must confirm that 
all agreements relating to conveyance of title are incorporated 
into the deed before they tender or accept it. Subject to 
limited exceptions, the merger doctrine remains viable in Utah 
and extinguishes all antecedent agreements upon delivery and 
acceptance of a deed. Buyers' claims involve the conveyance of 
title; therefore, the merger doctrine's exception for collateral 
rights does not apply and the parties' intent is irrelevant. 
Buyers admit they knew that sellers could not convey Lot 15 for 
six days prior to closing; therefore, the merger doctrine's 
exception for fraud does not apply. The trial court correctly 
concluded the merger doctrine precludes buyers' suit and properly 
granted sellers' motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, we 
affirm the trial court's order dismissing buyers' complaint with 
prejudice. 
ATTORNEY FEES UNDER EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT 
In Utah, attorney fees authorized by contract are awardable 
only in accordance with the explicit terms of the contract and 
only to the extent permitted by the contract. Turtle Management, 
Inc. v. Haggis Management. Inc.. 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982); 
Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 555-56 
(Utah App. 1989) . Parties seeking an award of attorney fees 
under a contract must establish that the contract's terms 
anticipate such an award. See Loosle v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass' n, 858 P.2d 999, 1003 (Utah 1993) (concluding attorney fees 
provision in trust deed and promissory note did not contemplate 
attorney fees for quiet title action). 
In the instant case, the only basis for attorney fees that 
sellers presented to the trial court was the earnest money 
agreement. Paragraph "N" of that agreement provides, in 
pertinent part: 
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Both parties agree that should either party 
default in any of the covenants or agreements 
herein contained, the defaulting party shall 
pay all costs and expenses, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or 
accrue from enforcing or terminating this 
Agreement or in pursuing any remedy provided 
hereunder or by applicable law, whether such 
remedy is pursued by filing suit or 
otherwise. 
This contractual provision requires those seeking an award of 
attorney fees to show that the other party has defaulted on at 
least one of the covenants or agreements of the earnest money 
agreement. Sellers argued because buyers did not recognize the 
abrogation clause's validity, buyers somehow defaulted, and 
sellers were entitled to attorney fees. Our analysis reveals 
buyers' nonrecognition of the abrogation clause is not a default 
anticipated by paragraph "N" of the earnest money agreement. 
Sellers point only to buyers' failure to recognize the 
validity of the abrogation clause as evidence of the default that 
entitled sellers to attorney fees. Parties to an earnest money 
agreement cannot default on the abrogation clause. We reiterate: 
the abrogation clause is a contractual statement of the merger 
doctrine. Paragraph "0" of the earnest money agreement simply 
states: "Except for express warranties made in this Agreement, 
execution and delivery of final closing documents shall abrogate 
this Agreement." The provision thus establishes the earnest 
money agreement's legal termination. 
Sellers did not point to any express warranties, covenants, 
or agreements on which buyers defaulted; therefore, sellers 
cannot invoke paragraph f,N" as a basis for an award of attorney 
fees. Paragraph "N" has limits; it does not award attorney fees 
to prevailing parties in every suit related to the earnest money 
agreement. In short, paragraph "N" does not contemplate an award 
of attorney fees for sellers just because buyers sued. See Carr 
v. Enoch Smith Co.. 781 P.2d 1292, 1296 (Utah App. 1989); £JL. 
Palmer v. Hayes, 892 P.2d 1059, 1062-63 (Utah App. 1995) (holding 
buyers' election of remedy under earnest money agreement was not 
default that entitled sellers to attorney fees). 
2. Because we conclude buyers did not establish an adequate 
basis for the trial court's award of attorney fees, we do not 
reach issues surrounding sufficiency of evidence for and 
calculation of the award. 
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In sum, attorney fees may be awarded under the instant 
contract only when one party can show that the other party has 
defaulted on an explicit covenant or agreement contained in the 
earnest money agreement. Sellers did not establish that buyers 
defaulted on any covenant or agreement and thus have no basis for 
an award of attorney fees. The trial court incorrectly concluded 
that buyers* failure to recognize the validity of the abrogation 
clause constituted a default by buyers. Accordingly, we reverse 
the trial court's award of attorney fees. 
CONCLUSION 
We hold the meiger doctrine precludes buyers from bringing 
their claims after buyers accept and record a deed from sellers. 
Buyers' "Closing Instructions" do not fall within any exception 
to the merger doctrine. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's 
summary judgment in favor of sellers. We further hold the 
attorney fees provision of the earnest money agreement does not 
permit an award of attorney fees to sellers in this case. Buyers 
did not default on the earnest money agreement simply by bringing 
suit against sellers. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's 
award of attorney fees to sellers and vacate the judgment against 
buyers. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gregory Jiff Orme, 
Presiding Judge 
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